Statistical procedures may subserve either of two ends. In the conduct of government, commerce, and manufacture it may be legitimate to invoke them with no aim other than to prescribe a course of action which limits certain assignable risks. We speak appropriately of any such prescription as conditional. In biological research our primary concern is to establish propositions worthy to take their place in the corpus of scientific knowledge accepted as a basis for subsequent action unrestricted by immediate administrative preoccupations. We speak of any such assertion as unconditional. Much needless confusion concerning the credentials of statistical techniques arises through failure to recognize how far each is meaningful in one or other domain. Since our concern in this context is with the validification of results obtained in the conduct of scientific research, unconditional statistical inference alone is relevant to the end in view.
In our previous communication (Hogben and Wrighton, 1952) , we have recognized a broad distinction between statistical procedures of two sorts, respectively referred to as tests and estimation.
Under the first heading we have seen that it is now necessary to distinguish two prescriptions:
(i) the significance test, which operates within the framework of a unique null hypothesis; (ii) the decision test, which involves the specification of alternative admissible hypotheses.
It is likewise necessary to distinguish between two ways in which contemporary writers use the term estimation, viz., point estimation and interval estimation. In either case, our concern is with a parameter (or parameters) of a particular universe from which we may draw a sample. Point estimation undertakes to specify a unique value of the parameter as the best one; but in doing so relinquishes the possibility of assigning an acceptable uncertainty safeguard to the form the assertion takes. Interval estimation repudiates the undertaking to specify any single value of it as better than every other. Within the framework of an acceptable level of uncertainty, i.e., probability of false assertion, it subsumes rules of procedure which entitle us to make statements delimiting a range of values within which the parameter lies.
In the opening paragraph of this contribution, and elsewhere in the previous one, we have drawn an admittedly provisional distinction between conditional and unconditional assertions in terms of the uses to which we put them. This is clear-cut in the sense that:
(a) any statement worthy to rank in the corpus of scientific knowledge is one which we can rightly describe as unconditional in the sense elsewhere defined;
(b) statements of the conditional sort may suffice as a basis for administrative decision. It is none the less possible to formulate rules of decision leading to unconditional statements of a sort rarely, if ever, relevant to the domain of research in pure science and no more useful to the administrator because more comprehensive in scope than a corresponding statement expressed in the more restricted form. Such is the class of decision tests which emerge in the theory of consumer and producer risk.
Further consideration of the Drosophila model of our earlier contribution will make this clear. We there set up two hypotheses: Ha that p = = Pa, and Hb that p = =Pb, p being the probability that any offspring of a particular mother will be female. If we make the rule to reject Ha ifx > (a + i) for the r-fold sample, denoting by Lx.a the probability that it will contain x females if P =Pa, we may assign as the conditional risk (oc) of rejection when Ha is true:
Lx.a.
x (a+ 1 Similarly, we may adopt Hb as our null hypothesis and make the rule to reject it if x < (b + ). The corresponding conditional risk (/) of rejection is then:
In either case, we attach an uncertainty safeguard (ac or ,B) to a statement which is conditional in the sense that it refers to a risk we take of being wrong if a particular hypothesis is correct. Unless a = b, the simultaneous application of the two rejection criteria will not necessarily lead to a decision in favour of either hypothesis; but we can formulate a composite rule which must do so in the form:
reject Ha if x > (k + 2) reject Hb if x < (k + )
We may then be able to If we know that the Drosophila culture contains several different genotypes to which we can assign values of p, we can meaningfully postulate prior probabilities referable to existent populations at risk to formalize the unconditional character of the final statement which the rule endorses. We must do so with due regard to its content, viz.: the probability of wrongly rejecting the hypothesis Pa < P < Pb is zero, since the rule does not allow us to reject it. We may then set out the argument in terms of the following symbols, e being positive: Pf 5 =°X £5
These hypotheses constitute an exclusive set of which our verdict can embody the acceptance of only one. Hence the addition rule applies, and our unconditional uncertainty safeguard is:
Pf Pi .Pf.1+ P2 . Pf.2 + P 3 * Pf.3 + P4 * Pf.4 + P5 * Pf.5 P1 (OC -1) + P2 * a P4 *C + P5 (C -85) (1 -P3) CXa-PI . -P5I *e5
The prescription of such a rule presupposes two target values ofp. These we can readily conceive in relation to standards of quality and to costing limits in an executive set-up, but the unconditional form the terminal statement assumes when we formulate a rule in this way embodies no relevant information other than the content of two types of conditional assertion. What the choice of a single acceptance-rejection criterion-score k accomplishes is that a statistical inspection plan then achieves its task, i.e., the test must lead to a decision to reject either Ha or Hb. In fact, both hypotheses may be wrong; and the unconditional form of the assertion is realizable only because the test can never lead to a corresponding assertion, i.e., a statement of the form Pa < P < Pb.
If we operate within the framework of a single hypothesis stated in the form P < Pa or p > Pb, and have defined our rejection criterion so that Pf < cx is the probability of rejecting it when true, we are free to limit our verdicts, as Fisher (1949) That the distinction between conditional and unconditional is not so clear-cut, as we have provisionally assumed in the foregoing contribution, therefore emphasizes the importance of examining the advantages or drawbacks of any statistical procedure with due regard to the type of terminal statements which it can or cannot endorse. One puzzling feature of a test procedure which operates within the framework of a unique null hypothesis arises from the naive assumption that the appropriate form of the latter is in the words of Fisher (1949) , the "hypothesis that the phenomenon to be demonstrated is in fact absent". Current practice interprets this to signify that the true difference with reference to treatment efficacy is zero. All the test can thus achieve is to assess the risk of accepting one treatment as better than another when they are equally good. Unless it is clear that there exists on this planet a body of persons actively interested in a rule of procedure with such terms of reference, it can lead only to statements which are either noncommittal or irrelevant.
The administrator concerned with allocation of costly resources will wish to know whether Treatment B is at least so much better than Treatment A.
The physician anxious to invoke any means of possible benefit will ask the same sort of question but set his target value at a lower level. explore the possibility of designing the trial in terms of treatment-group size to ensure that the length of the interval will not exceed an acceptable limit; but this presupposes some ulterior criterion of acceptable accuracy.
In our view, interval estimation is the one available procedure which offers the prospect of statistical validification of judgments which are the chief concern of the research worker in the conduct of the clinical trial. Its neglect in the domain of medical statistics would, therefore, be difficult to explain, if it were not also true that the basic postulates involve:
(i) a radical departure from the concept of point estimation which is traceable to the LegendreGauss theory of errors; (ii) an overdue reorientation of our views concerning the nature of statistical validification. Because the new approach associated with the term confidence interval is still novel in the context of the clinical trial, it will not be profitless if we set forth its implications between two schools of doctrine against the background of simple statistical models with numerical illustrations.
The development of the theory is largely due to J. Neyman; but credit for an early explicit statement of a procedure appropriate to large samples in the domain of taxonomic scoring is due to Wilson (1927) . Since Wilson's contribution has received little recognition, it will not be out of place to quote his words from a later paper (Wilson, 1942): In 1927 I called attention to the fact that many statements about probability are highly elliptical and illustrated the matter by the simple case of a pointbinomial universe with unknown probability p and observed value po in some sample. Using the admittedly rough estimate of probability based on the standard deviation one ordinarily writes:
Po -AL\/pOqo/n < p < po + A-\/poo/n, and states that the probability that the true value p in the universe lies between the limits given may be had from a probability-integral MODEL I (a).-We shall conceive that a lottery wheel has 1,024 sectors labelled with scores x, (x + 1), (x + 2), (x + 3) . . . (x + 9), (x + 10), respectively allocated to 1, 10, 45, 120, 210, 252, 210, 120, 45, 10 MX-Sm to-05 < M < Mx + Sm *s (i) MODEL I (b).-Our last model invokes the system of scoring distinguished as representative in the previous contribution of this series. Our concern is then commonly with the sample mean of a set of measurements or counts. Our next model illustrates the confidence approach to estimation in the domain of taxonomic scoring, as when we estimate the proportion of affected in a treatment group. We now suppose that our lottery wheel has 100 sectors on each of which the number of pips is either 0 or 1. We do not know the number [100q] of sectors which carry no pips, or the number [100p = 100 ( -q)] of sectors which carry one pip. We spin it one hundred times and record the mean score. Our problem is to define confidence limits ofp, the proportion of sectors which carry one pip. We are here sampling in an infinite two-class universe, and successive terms of (q + p)'00 define the frequencies of the observed proportionate (mean) scorep0 = 0, 0-01, 0-02, 0 03 . . . 0-09, 1-0. The unknown variance of the distribution ofp0 is given by:
Throughout the range of prescribed values, from p = 0 1 to p = 0-9 inclusive, the distribution of the observed proportionate score will be approximately normal. The range p0 = p ± 2ap will therefore define the 95 per cent. confidence level well enough for expository purposes. Since orp depends on p being zero when p = 0 or p = 1, the two boundaries of acceptable values of p0 will not be parallel straight lines as in Fig. 1 .
They will meet at p = 0 and p = 1, the upper being concave downwards, the lower being concave upwards, as in Fig. 2 . The corresponding acceptable range of p values for any observed value of po is unobtainable graphically, as before, by drawing a horizontal line parallel to the abscissa; but each limit is subsumed by the two roots of the quadratic:
If the observed mean value is 0 62, this becomes: 
If the size of the sample is small, we can define for any value of p limits which exclude a proportion equal to or less than 2-5 per cent. (or other agreed figure) at either end of the range by recourse to the tables of the binomial (Clopper and Pearson, 1934; National Bureau of Standards, 1949 If the score x is an integer, e.g. k or (k + 1), we can postulate an infinitude of values to which we can assign the probability oc that x > m in the range k < m < k + 1. It will be convenient to write P(x > k) for the probability that x exceeds k and P(x > k) = P(x > k -1) for the probability that x is not less then k. We may subsume both (iii) and (iv) to cover the possibility that m may or may not be a whole number in the expressions: P(x>m)>, m and P(x_m)>s-m s s
Let us now set m = cxs, so that:
The proportion of all samples whose score x exceeds cxs is thus no less than 100(1-cx) per cent.; and the proportion of all samples whose score x is not less than cxs is greater than 100(1-ax) per cent. We may express this by saying that our uncertainty safeguard for the assertion that s is less than 20x does not exceed 5 per cent. and our uncertainty safeguard for the assertion that s is at least 20x is less than 5 per cent. On the basis of observations of single spins with scores of x = 5 and x = 10, respectively, our assertions would thus take the following form, if we deem Pf < ax as an acceptable level of uncertainty: Why we cannot express our confidence level in the form of an exact specification of the uncertainty safeguard of the form Pf = cx will be clear if we state the foregoing rules in another way. In effect, Rule (i) signifies that we propose to disregard all samples if x < ocs, and Rule (ii) that we shall consistently disregard samples if x < axs. We can get a backstage view of their implications, if we determine the proportion of excluded samples, i.e. the true uncertainty safeguard prescribed by each rule for values of s in the neighbourhood of 200, when cx = 0 05 defines the upper limit of acceptability for our uncertainty safeguard and the sample score is x = 10. For s = 199, 200, and 201 respectively, cs = 9 * 95, 10, and 10 -05.
By Rule (i) we disregard samples whose scores are 9, 10, and 10. The exact probabilities (Pf) The probabilities that the score lies in the range from 1 to k or beyond k are then expressible as:
and P(x>k)=- (ii)
When we write down P(x > scx) = -ac or P(/s < x < ocs) = 3-, we state the probability of an event, i.e. the value of the unit score x, within the framework of the classical theory of probability and the convenient fiction that the distribution is continuous. Our assertion signifies: for the fixed 212 STATISTICAL THEORY OF PROPHYLACTIC AND THERAPEUTIC TRIALS-II 213 value s of the relevant parameter, P.S is the probability that the unit score will lie in such and such a range. We have refrained from writing the probability we assign to the equivalent assertions in the notation P (s < xo 1) = 1-oc or P (-'1x > s > oc-1 x) = oc-, lest we should hastily interpret them in terms of inverse probability, i.e. as if we could legitimately say: for the fixed value x of the unit score, Ps.x is the probability that s will lie in the specified range. Such a form of words is inconsistent with Neyman's theory. We must interpret a statement in the form P(ax > s > bx) = y as a summary of the long run result of consistently adopting one and the same rule of conduct regardless of the value (e.g. x = 5) the score x may have in any single trial, including the particular trial to which our specification of the interval estimate is referable. The formal statement of the rule will be adequate only if it explicitly specifies x as an unknown which may assume any value within its admissible range. We misinterpret it if we condense our verdict in such a form as:
This is an act of self-deception into which we easily slide, if we write the formal identities:
We have now eliminated any reference to x as a variable in the expression on the left, and have obtained on the right what is seemingly the element of a probability distribution and satisfies the fundamental property of the latter, if we fix x and define the range of s from h = x to h-c, so that, rm x h-2.dh= 1 x This step, which leads to what Fisher calls a fiducial probability distribution, is admissible only if we can legitimately confine our statements to situations in which x has one and the same value (e.g. x = 5). We could then write:
If k = 20x, we thus obtain by a somewhat circuitous route a result already derived within the framework of the assumed continuous rectangular distribution, i.e. P(s < 20x) = 0 95. It follows that many results embodied in Fisher's approach to interval estimation will tally with those to which the theory of confidence intervals leads us; and indeed many statisticians were at one time blind to what we now see to be a radical difference. If we conceive x . f(h)dh as an element of a probability distribution, we have to regard h and x as independent to arrive at a numerical result consistent with confidence theory in the continuous domain; but we can do so only if we then treat x as a constant in the algebraic manipulation. We thus implicitly fix our interval in terms of a pre-assigned value of x to arrive at the specification of a probability dependent thereon; but this is inconsistent with the programme of Neyman's theory, which specifies the interval in terms of a pre-assigned probability independent of the outcome 'of any single trial and hence of any pre-assigned value of x.
RELATION OF ESTIMATION TO TEST PROCEDURE
If we regard the problem of estimation as that of assigning a probability to the truth of the assertion that some unique definitive parameter of a homogeneous universe lies between specified limits, we sidestep the disquieting dilemma with which the balance sheet of Bayes confronts us. Bayes's theorem is essentially about a stratified universe, e.g. a bag in which some pennies with unlike faces are unbiassed and one penny (through a defect of minting) has the King's head on both sides. In effect, it says:
"To know how often I should be right in judging a coin taken from the bag to be the one defective coin after getting ten successive heads in a single 10-fold toss, I must also know how many other coins the bag contains."
If we presume its relevance to a general theory of test procedure, one horn of the dilemma to which the theorem draws attention is that we rarely have such knowledge. The other is that all the coins may indeed be alike,-and our only source of relevant information is the one coin we have tossed. The theory of confidence intervals sidesteps the dilemma by restricting our attention to all we can know in situations which disclose prior knowledge of neither sort. It is the writers' belief that Neyman (1934) did not overstate the novelty or the importance of the viewpoint we have explored against the background of the preceding models, when he declared:
The solution of the problem which I described as confidence intervals has been sought by the greatest minds since the work of Bayes 150 years ago. Any recent book on the theory of probability includes large sections concerning this problem. To those whose approach to problems of cognition is essentially behaviouristic, it is therefore by no means obvious that the model situation appropriate to Bayes's theorem has any relevance to circumstances in which we have no opportunity of exercising the preliminary act of choice prescribed thereby; but there need be no dispute about the relevance of the prior probabilities to the prescription of a test procedure. Our examination of the mixed culture situtation shows that neither ignorance of the precise prior probabilities each referable to an existent population nor the unreality of the assumption that we necessarily carry out the enquiry in two stages need deter us from formulating a rule of decision with an assignable uncertainty safeguard. When we choose our rejection criterion to make the error of the first kind equal to the error of the second kind (c -), we arrive at the identity Pf = ax for all values of the prior probabilities, and the relation a < Pf <f for P > ox is likewise true for all values of the prior probabilities, including the limiting case when they are respectively zero and unity. Thus the rule holds good, whether we can realistically interpret the decision against the background of Bayes's model or in situations to which the two-stage sampling procedure implicit in the model has no factual relevance. This is the course we now propose to adopt with respect to interval estimation. Our new models will admit of a factual preliminary choice of the sub-universe from which we sample, with a view to exhibiting the irrelevance of such an assumption and its implications to the procedure of interval estimation. Indeed, we shall postulate situations to which the Bayes balance sheet is truly relevant. Our universe will be a stratified universe, and our problem to attach an acceptable uncertainty safeguard to the assertion that a parameter definitive of the particular stratum from which we take a particular sample lies within a specified range. We shall now make the following rule. We shall reject some hypotheses as inadmissible and reserve judgment on others which we shall accordingly regard as admissible, applying to each hypothesis the same criterion of rejection, i.e. that it assigns to the deviation of the observed score (Mx = 6 3) from the expected value (M) prescribed by the particular hypothesis a value numerically greater than 2am. We then reject all hypotheses, except IV-VITI inclusive, and are left with the assertion that M lies in the range 5 -8-6-8, corresponding to values of x from 0 8 to I * 8.
MODEL II (a)
Our uncertainty safeguard for the rejection of every hypothesis when true is ac = 0 05 since our rejection criterion is modular. That the unconditional uncertainty safeguard for the final verdict is also 0 * 05, as for MODEL I (a), we may make explicit as follows. We first remind ourselves that we can falsely reject only one hypothesis since only one can be true. Thus the unconditional probability of a false verdict is the unconditional probability of falsely rejecting one or other of an exclusive set of hypotheses, and is therefore obtainable by recourse to the addition rule. If Ph is the prior probability that the particular hypothesis H is applicable to the situation, i.e. that we choose at random a wheel of type H to spin, the probability of falsely rejecting it is xPh; and by definition:
The probability of making a false decision is the probability of falsely rejecting any one of the hypotheses, i.e.: iPh. CC -=OC zPh = aX.
Thus oa is our uncertainty safeguard to the assertion that M lies within the prescribed limits; and the prior probabilities of Bayes do not affect its value. We have thus arrived at exactly the same result as in the MODEL I (a) situation, where we set the same uncertainty safeguard to the same range of admissible values of the parameter x in the unstratified universe ofone and the same wheel.
In the set-up of this Model, we regard any one of a limitless number of values p may have as a hypothesis referable to a conceivably, but not necessarily, existent population at risk. We thus interpret the process of estimation as a method of screening an exhaustive set of hypotheses as admissible or otherwise by successively applying to each a test prescribing the same probability of rejection if the hypothesis is indeed true. Our universe of hypotheses so conceived is a stratified universe, in which strata with the same definitive parameter Ph provisionally constitute an existent population at risk with an assignable finite prior probability in the jargon of Bayes's theorem. Bayes's prior probabilities (Ph) are then inherent in the initial formulation of the problem; but they do not appear in the solution. Consequently, we are free to assign to the prior probability of any single hypothesis any value in the range 0 to 1 consistent with the restriction that the sum of all the prior probabilities is unity. Whether there corresponds an existent population to a particular hypothesis in our fictitious stratified universe is therefore immaterial. That a particular hypothesis to which we apply the test corresponds to no existent population merely means that Ph -0. To conceive the universe as unstratified is to assign Ph = 1 to one stratum and Ph = 0 to every other one. In this sense, MODEL I is therefore a limiting case of MODEL IL.
This way of looking at the problem of estimation makes the distinction between the domain of test decision and estimation less clear-cut than the alternative. If we interpret the procedure of estimation in terms of the model of this section, we can regard it as the performance of a battery of tests, but the score value which defines the criterion of rejection is different for each test and the decision to reject any one hypothesis or group of hypotheses does not prescribe acceptance of any other single hypothesis. We successively apply to each a test involving a new value of the score deviation (x -M) as the criterion which ensures the same probability of rejection for each hypothesis when true. If we assert that one group of hypotheses constitutes an admissible (in contradistinction to a residual group as an inadmissible) set, we then do so on the assumption that one of the former is identifiable with the correct one.
MODEL II (c).-In our choice of a common criterion of rejection for the hypotheses sifted in the treatment of the foregoing model, we may assume, as we have assumed, a normal distribution of the mean score without incurring exceptionable error. Accordingly, we have defined the uncertainty safeguard of the prescribed rule by the identity Pf = ox; but any such formulation is strictly valid only in the fictitious domain of the continuous variate. It will therefore be profitable to examine a model situation in which we cannot legitimately invoke the normal, or any other continuous, distribution.
In the homogeneous universe of MODEL I, we have seen that we can set an upper limit (Pf < x or Pf < oa)
to the uncertainty safeguard we attach to a confidence boundary in the domain of discrete score values; but we cannot make an exact statement of the form Pf =x.
Let us now therefore look at the problem raised by MODEL I (C) of SECTION 2 (above) as one of sampling in a stratified universe. We shall postulate as below an assemblage of one hundred lottery wheels of twelve types with consecutive scores 1 to m inclusive, if s = m is the number of sectors of a wheel of type H. Thus we have twelve hypotheses about s to explore, each referable to an existent population at risk; and we shall once more limit our decisions to rejection and reservation of judgment. We know the score x of a single spin without knowing the type of wheel to which it is referable. Our problem will be to assign a probability to an admissible set of hypotheses. 
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In the treatment of MODEL I (c) we have already recognized one reason for regarding the concept of fiducial probability as an inadequate basis for a theory of statistical inference in that it restricts the field of discussion to continuous variates. Further consideration of the model situation we have last discussed gives us an opportunity for contrasting two theories of interval estimation from a different viewpoint.
Fiducial probability takes its origin in concepts, some of which are common to the theory of confidence intervals; but Neyman's development of the latter is inconsistent with Fisher's interpretation of the former, unless there is some sense in which only one admissible pre-assigned rule of test procedure is appropriate to one and the same situation. MODELS I (c) and 11 (c) do indeed refer to a situation in which only one such rule invites our attention as relevant to the end in view; but we have not excluded the possibility that more than one might each have seemingly equal claims to commend it from a purely formal viewpoint. We shall now examine a situation in which this dilemma arises.
Since a continuum is implicit in the concept of fiducial probability, we shall postulate a continuous rectangular distribution over the range 2to s + , and examine what statements we may make when we draw two unit samples with scores xl and x2. Two, though not the only two, rules which we may formulate will serve our purpose well enough for heuristic purposes. We shall alternatively seek to prescribe an upper confidence limit to s with an uncertainty safeguard oc by recourse to:
(i) the maximum score xm being xm = xi if X1 X X2, and xm X2 ifX2 > X1;
(ii) the score sum x12 x= x + x2 . The probability that xm < m is the probability assignable to the joint occurrence that each score lies in the range from x = 0 to x = m inclusive, i.e.: P(xm m) 2 and P(xm > m) = 1-M2
We wish our final assertion to take the form s < kx with a probability (1-cc) of correct assertion if we consistently follow the test procedure, whence we write:
P(Xm > m) =(l-c) 2=OC and S2 P(Xm> S /c)=1-a . Within the framework of this rule, we then assign cc as the uncertainty safeguard to the assertion: Xm s< VI/a If we base our test procedure on x12 defined as above, the reader unfamiliar with the continuous rectangular distribution will find it helpful first to make a simple chessboard diagram of the 2-fold discrete score sum distribution. It is then evident that we may express the probability that x12 lies in the range 2 to k if x 1 is the origin of the unit score distribution in two ways: P(x2>k) (2s-k) (2s-k+ 1) when k>s+1
For the continuous case we may represent our chessboard geometrically as a rectangle of area 52 and the region in which all values x12 < k lie when k < s as a triangle of area ik2. Since we wish to associate a probability (1-a) near unity to the truth of the assertion s < k -. x, our concern will be with the smaller value of k (Fig. 3) . We may answer this by considering the consequences of confining our attention in a sequence of trials to samples with some pre-assigned value of xm or x12. Let us first suppose the pre-assigned value of xm to be 3. The different sorts of double samples that are consistent with this value occur with equal frequencies and are specifiable as follows: (1,3), (2,3), (3,3), (3,2), (3,1). This set of equally frequent values is the same for all values of s consistent with the specification xm = 3. Thus we have suppressed no information about s by scoring our sample in this way. Is the same true of x12?
Let us now consider samples with reference to which x12 = 8. This specification is consistent with any value s > 4, but this condition does not suffice to specify what individual values x1 and x2 have. If s = 4, the only double sample consistent with the specification x12 = 8 is (4,4). If s= 5, three paired score values are allowable: (3,5), (4,4), (5,3). If s = 6 we may have: (2,6), (3,5), (4,4), (5,3), (6,2). Thus we can say more about s, if we know the individual score of x1 and x2 than we can if we know only the value of the insufficient statistic x12; but the individual values of x1 and x2 tell us no more than we already know, if told the value of the sufficient statistic xm.
We have now to state the definition of a sufficient statistic formally. To do so, we first remind ourselves that to each 2-fold sample specified in terms of the sequence of unit samples we may assign as above a bivariate score, e.g. (3,5) or (5,3) . We may then speak of P12.s as the unconditional probability that any sample has the bivariate score (xl , x2) and P12-, as the conditional probability that it has this score if xm is the maximum score. In the same sense, we may label the unconditional probability of a multivariate score (X1, X2, X3 . Xr) definitive of an r-fold sample as P(1-2-3 ... r).P for a distribution whose definitive parameter is p and P . 2.3.... )r.x as its conditional probability when the sample statistic is x, if we can define it from our knowledge of x alone. We may then define by PX.p the probability that the sample statistic will be x if the paramete7r is p and obtain by recourse to the product rule: P(12...*r).p = Px.p.P(1.2.. .r).x We have now split into two factors the unconditional probability of getting the multivariate score which summarizes all the information the sample supplies, since its specification incorporates both the numerical values of each constituent unit sample and the order in which they turn up. One of these factors is independent of p if the statistic is sufficient, i.e. if (as is true of P12.m) we can specify it without knowing the value of the universe parameter. We thus take as our formal criterion of a sufficient statistic the resolution of the probability of the multivariate score into two factors of which one does not contain p.
By recourse to a simple chessboard lay-out of 52 cells, with border scores from x = I to x = s inclusive and x = 1 to x = s inclusive, we may amplify this breakdown with reference to xn, and x12 for the discrete rectangular universe. Each cell of the grid is referable to a unique pair of values x -xl and x = x2, but the same value of t= (xl + x2) or of xm = m is assignable to more than one cell if t = 2. Cells specified by xm = m lie on two sides of a square of m cells, there being (2m -1) in all. If we write P12s. for the probability that the sample records the unique pair of score values x, and x2 when the number of sectors is s, and P12.m for the probability that xm = m when x has these two values on the same assumption, and Pm. s for the probability that xm = m when s is the number of sectors, we thus see that In the same sense we may speak of the number (x) of successes in an r-fold sample from an infinite two-class universe as a sufficient statistic of the parameter p. We may denote by P(1.2-3.. r)p the probability that the sample records successes and failures in a fixed order, there being r(x) different samples so distinguishable for the particular value x. Thus we may write: P(l23. . r) . p = px. qx; P(123..r).x r(x) Px.p r(x) px . qx; P( 123 -*r) .P= P(123. r) .x 'Px.p One circumstance which gives the concept of sufficiency a peculiar importance vis a' vis Fisher's approach to the problem of interval estimation is that it is not always possible to specify a sample by a statistic which is sufficient in his sense of the term. Since the fiducial probability distribution is in his formulation referable only to sufficient statistics, and only to sufficient statistics themselves referable to continuous distributions, the fiducial theory of interval estimation is of much more limited application on its own terms than is Neyman's theory of confidence intervals.* * The following citation specifies the attitude of Fisher (1936) attitude to the concept of sufficiency:
. This consideration is vital to the fiducial type of argument, which purports to infer exact statements of the probabilities that unknown hypothetical quantities, or that future observations, shall lie within assigned limits, on the basis of a body of observational experience. No such process could be justified unless the relevant information latent in this experience were exhaustively mobilised and incorporated in our inference. The indisputably prior claim of taxonomic scoring in many types of trial has certain disadvantages from the view-point of the statistician. Any acceptable method of estimation in the taxonomic domain must prescribe the use of very large samples; and if it is true that we can formulate the distribution of a proportionate score difference referable to indefinitely large samples, we cannot as yet precisely specify how large they must be to justify our assurance that its use will not lead us astray.
We have seen that confidence intervals are specifiable with reference to a discrete variate, such as the proportionate score of an r-fold sample from the two-class universe (MODEL I (b)), only if we are content to express our uncertainty safeguard in the form Pf < a. If the size of the sample is sufficiently large, we may invoke the normal approximation without sensible error. In that event, our uncertainty safeguard may permissibly take the form Pf = a, and the solution of the problem will be as originally given by Wilson (ii) within the framework of normal quadrature as a computing device for summation of terms of a discrete distribution, and pending an approach to the problem by new methods which we hope to explore in a subsequent communication, we must confine ourselves either to assertions which may be over-cautious or to assertions which may be unduly favourable to the new treatment.
To get into focus the major issues raised by interval estimation in the domain of representative scoring we should bear in mind two considerations:
(a) the assumption that the normal distribution of unit variance tallies closely with that of the unit sample score expressed in standard form is highly gratuitous; (b) even when such an assumption is grossly erroneous, the sample size need not be large to ensure a close normal fit for the distribution of the sample mean and that of the difference between the means of samples from different universes. The last statement is true even when the number of score classes of the u.s.d. is small. Thus the error in assigning the sum of terms in the range ± 2am by recourse to the normal integral with due regard to the half-interval correction is trivial for the 51 scoreclass distribution of the 10-fold sample mean from a six-class rectangular universe (e.g. unbiassed cubical die).
It is necessary to emphasize the foregoing distinction for two reasons:
(i) we cannot make any general statement about how large an error we incur, if we invoke the t-distribution of the mean score of samples from a normal parent universe; (ii) In what follows, we shall use the published data of 24 trials to illustrate results of applying the statistics specified in Expressions (ix) and (xi). rule to finite samples will lead to different risks of false assertion, some greater and some less than oa;
and this may lead us to an unduly optimistic assessment of the operational advantage. Our uncertainty safeguard takes the unequivocal form Pf < oc if we use Method I, but the length of the two-sided confidence interval 2had.5 will be greater than the length of the confidence interval 2had based on the true value of ad, and the value of h which suffices to specify as oc the upper limit of Pf. As explained above, the penalty of making our assertion overcautious in this sense will be less exacting if the true operational level of the test, elsewhere defined, is near 50 per cent. legitimately say about the relative merits of two treatment procedures on the basis of the evidence at his disposal, he may then refrain from asking how far the evidence at the disposal of the statistician is in fact relevant to unspecified circumstances incident to the trial. Though there is a deep cleavage between opposing schools of current thought, theoretical statisticians with otherwise widely diverse views seem to make common cause in seeking interpretations consistent with two assumptions:
(a) with proper precautions we may regard each treatment group as a sample taken randomwise from an infinite population; (b) on the same understanding, the same homogeneous infinite population is the source of any other such sample chosen subsequently with the same precautions.
The circumstances in which such assumptions are more or less relevant to the use we make of an interval estimate are not self-evident nor immune from legitimate scrutiny; and we hope to examine in a later communication the propriety of invoking statistical theory as a basis for extrapolation beyond the limits of a clearly defined framework of repetition.
